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CLIMATE & ENERGY POLICY BRIEF

Algeria Rebuilt Its Wildfire Governance in One Season. Sudan's Climate Institutions Have Waited a Decade.

Why a single coordination committee — not another strategy document — is the deliverable Sudan needs now

3BI — Build Back Better Initiative · 9 September 2026



Algeria Rebuilt Its Wildfire Governance in One Season. Sudan's Climate Institutions Have Had a Decade — and Still Lack the Basics.

Research Team

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Contents

The Ask	1
Why Now	1
The Evidence	1
Addressing the Counter-Case	2
What 3Bi Recommends, Specifically	3
Sourcing & Contact	3



Algeria built a national forest-risk coordination committee in months after its 2026 wildfires. Sudan has known its own climate-governance gaps since 2016 and still hasn't closed them — here's the low-cost fix.

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The Ask

We recommend that Sudan's Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR), working with the transitional executive, use the current Green Climate Fund (GCF) National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Readiness process to stand up a single, cross-sectoral Climate Risk Coordination Committee this quarter — not another strategy document, but the standing institutional body Algeria just built in six months after its 2026 wildfire season. Sudan does not lack climate diagnoses. It lacks a body with the mandate to act on them across ministries, states, and hazards at once.

Why Now

Three deadlines are converging. First, Sudan's GCF-funded NAP Readiness project — running since 2022 to fix the exact coordination and data gaps this brief addresses — is due for a progress review, and reviewers will be looking for institutional deliverables, not just workshops (Green Climate Fund, accessed 9 September 2026). Second, UNFCCC Climate Week 4 is under way in Baku through 11 September 2026, with its Implementation Forum (9–10 September) built specifically around how governments turn climate commitments into delivery mechanisms — exactly the gap this brief targets (UNFCCC, 9 September 2026). Third, Sudan's climate-disaster caseload is not waiting for institutions to catch up: the UN reported in late August 2026 that fighting and seasonal floods together displaced 200,000 more people, compounding a crisis already pushing Darfur malnutrition rates toward 70% (UN News, 25 August 2026). Every month without a coordinating body is a month of ad hoc, siloed response to floods, drought, and localized wildfire risk that a single committee could otherwise triage together.

The Evidence

1. Algeria shows the model works, and works fast. After its 2026 wildfire season reopened public debate over forest-risk management, Algeria did not commission another review — it activated a National Forest Protection Committee (Comité National de Protection des Forêts), installed in early 2026, built on legal and institutional groundwork laid in prior years. Energy-sector analyst Dr. Manal Sakhri, writing in *attaqa.net* on 6 September 2026, sets out the committee's operating



logic in five parts, and each maps directly onto Sudan's own gaps: (a) integrated governance that treats fire risk as a cross-cutting issue spanning environment, urban planning, civil protection, and local development rather than a firefighting-only problem, coordinated nationally but executed locally; (b) pre-emptive technology — satellite monitoring, sensors, drones, and drought/vegetation mapping feeding a single early-warning system, rather than scattered agency-specific tools; (c) sustained response capacity, including aerial firefighting assets whose distribution follows risk maps rather than politics; (d) formal integration of local communities into detection and reporting, and of fire-risk criteria into urban planning (evacuation routes, water points, safe buffer distances) rather than treating settlement expansion and forest-risk management as separate policy tracks; and (e) recovery framed explicitly as climate adaptation — replanting chosen for future drought and heat conditions, not simply restoring what burned, with transitional income support for communities dependent on forest resources (attaqa.net, 6 September 2026).

2. Sudan's own diagnosis has existed since 2016 — and named these exact gaps. Sudan submitted one of only thirteen national adaptation plans worldwide, built through consultations across all 18 states, covering water, agriculture, pastoralism, health, and energy (UNDP Climate Change Adaptation, accessed 9 September 2026). But the GCF-funded NAP Readiness proposal that followed — under implementation since 2022 — exists specifically because that 2016 plan lacked reliable climate data and impact assessments, well-designed training for state-level technical committees, and functioning federal-to-state coordination capacity (Green Climate Fund, accessed 9 September 2026). In other words: Sudan has known what is missing for years. What has not existed is a body with the standing authority to close the gap rather than re-diagnose it. HCENR, as the nominal lead institution, is currently working on an NDC implementation strategy focused on exactly this — institutional cooperation, data-sharing, and adaptation-planning capacity (PreventionWeb, accessed 9 September 2026) — but a strategy document is not the same as a committee with cross-ministerial teeth and a budget line, which is what Algeria built.

3. The transparency gap compounds the coordination gap. As 3Bi reported on 7 September 2026, Sudan's most recent formal climate transparency submission on record is a January 2022 Biennial Update Report, predating the Paris Agreement's current reporting system, with no Biennial Transparency Report identified ahead of the 31 December 2026 deadline that Baku Climate Week 4 is built around (UNFCCC First Biennial Transparency Reports registry; 3Bi Situation Report, 7 September 2026). A coordinating committee with a genuine data mandate would be positioned to produce that reporting as a byproduct of its normal work, rather than as a separate, under-resourced scramble each reporting cycle — precisely the kind of institutional deliverable that donors assessing NAP Readiness progress will want to see.



Addressing the Counter-Case

The strongest objection is timing: Sudan is fighting a war, and a government under active conflict, with a fractured territorial authority, cannot stand up new coordinating bodies the way a stable state like Algeria can. This is fair, and 3Bi does not dismiss it. But the counter-case proves too much if taken to its logical end — it would mean Sudan should build no climate institutions at all until the war ends, while floods, drought, and displacement do not pause for negotiations. The more precise version of the objection is about scope, not feasibility: a full Algeria-style aerial firefighting fleet is not realistic for wartime Sudan, and this brief does not recommend one. What is realistic, and consistent with a fragmented territorial authority, is the coordination layer itself — a committee that pools existing HCENR, state-level, and humanitarian-cluster data and decision rights, rather than one that requires new hardware or budget lines contingent on full territorial control. Algeria's own account stresses that its model required "not necessarily new structures" but better linkage of what already exists (attaqa.net, 6 September 2026) — a lower bar that a transitional Sudanese authority, working with UN agencies already present on the ground, can plausibly clear even now.

What 3Bi Recommends, Specifically

First, HCENR should formally propose the Climate Risk Coordination Committee as a named, budgeted deliverable of the existing GCF NAP Readiness project at its next progress review, rather than a new, competing initiative — this uses financing and legitimacy that already exist. Second, the committee's initial mandate should be narrow and achievable within current conditions: a single shared early-warning data feed combining rainfall, flood, and drought indicators already collected separately by HCENR, FAO, and humanitarian clusters, published on a public dashboard within 90 days. Third, Sudan's negotiators or observers at Baku Climate Week 4's Implementation Forum (9–10 September) should raise this committee proposal directly with GCF and UNFCCC counterparts this week, while the relevant donor and technical audience is assembled in one place — a low-cost, high-visibility way to signal institutional intent ahead of the December BTR deadline. Fourth, HCENR should commit, publicly, to producing Sudan's first Biennial Transparency Report as the committee's first formal output, giving the new body an immediate, externally visible test of whether it functions.

Sourcing & Contact

Sources: attaqa.net (6 September 2026); Green Climate Fund, "Adaptation planning support for Sudan through FAO"; UNDP Climate Change Adaptation Sudan country page; PreventionWeb, HCENR organisational profile; UNFCCC Climate Week Baku (CW4) programme; UN News, 25 August 2026; 3Bi Situation Report, 7 September 2026. For follow-up, contact 3Bi's Research Team



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