
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COP31 Wants Loss and Damage Help Delivered Faster. Sudan Is Not Among the 17 Active Requests. Name a Liaison and File One in Antalya.

3Bi Research Team | Policy Brief | 13 November 2026

2026-11-13 · Research Team

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COP31 is writing rules to speed up the Santiago Network, the UN's loss and damage help desk, which has 17 active requests, including Yemen, Iraq and Kenya. Sudan is not among them. It should name a liaison now and file a request by January.

On 12 November 2026, COP31 negotiators in Antalya discussed a draft decision on the Santiago Network for loss and damage technical assistance, which has 17 active requests; Sudan is not among them. (Illustration: 3Bi)

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The Ask

Before COP31 closes on 20 November, Sudan's UNFCCC focal point at the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR) should nominate a National Liaison to the Santiago Network, the UN mechanism that sends experts to help vulnerable countries deal with climate-driven loss and damage, and tell the Network's team in Antalya that a formal request for technical assistance will follow by the end of January 2027. At the same time, Sudan's negotiators should back the lines in the draft COP31 decision that would set delivery timelines for these requests, reserve a minimum share of the help for the most vulnerable communities and ask donors for multi-year funding. The cost is low: one nomination letter, and a request Sudan's delegates already worked on at a Network workshop in July 2025. The window is narrow, because the rules for how the queue is run are being written this week, while the pipeline fills up.

Why Now

On 12 November, negotiators in Antalya worked through the latest draft decision on the joint annual report of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), the UN's loss and damage body, and its Santiago Network. The Group of 77 and China supported a minimum percentage of Network-funded technical assistance for vulnerable communities, a check on whether that assistance works, and a progress report. They also asked developed countries to provide multi-year funding for the Network, and asked the Secretariat to assess whether its resources are sufficient. The EU, the UK, the Environmental Integrity Group and Norway opposed those requests, saying they go beyond the agenda item and belong in the finance talks (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 13 November 2026).

The draft text itself, dated 11 November, records the Network's growth to more than 40 requests for technical assistance by 1 October 2026, "while noting with concern that only four such requests for assistance were under implementation and only one such request had been completed". It asks the Network's Advisory Board, no later than its 8th meeting, to set indicative timelines for each stage of a request and to consider adopting a minimum percentage of directly funded

assistance for the most vulnerable communities. It also encourages the Network and the Board of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) to coordinate technical help and money at country level, and urges developed countries to give the Network "predictable multi-year funding" (UNFCCC, draft text on SBSTA 65 item 5 / SBI 65 item 12, version of 11 November 2026). None of this is agreed yet. The draft says that even its unbracketed text "does not constitute agreed language".

The Network came to Antalya with about 45 requests submitted, 17 of them active, and projects in the Cook Islands, Kenya, Namibia and Yemen moving into implementation (Santiago Network, press release, 6 November 2026). It holds its COP31 side event on 17 November. A country that is in the pipeline when the new timelines take effect will benefit from them first. A country outside it will not.

The Evidence

First, Sudan is not in the active queue. The Network's 2026 annual report lists all 17 active requests. Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Barbados/Grenada are at the call-for-proposals stage. Rwanda, Zambia, Palau, Iraq, Fiji, Bhutan, Nepal, Niue and Kyrgyzstan are under evaluation or selection. Kenya, the Cook Islands, Yemen and Namibia are under implementation, and Vanuatu's request is in closure. Fifty-three per cent of all requests come from Africa, and 42 per cent of the assistance focuses on least developed countries (LDCs) (UNFCCC, FCCC/SB/2026/3/Add.2, 29 October 2026). Sudan, an LDC, is not on the list. Nor does Sudan appear on the Network's public list of National Liaisons, the government contacts who move requests forward, when we checked it on 13 November 2026. The list does include Egypt, South Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia (Santiago Network, National Liaisons page, accessed 13 November 2026). The annual report counts 62 countries with liaisons as of 1 October, 25 of them in Africa, so the public page may lag. We cannot see the full list of roughly 45 submitted requests, and 3Bi is not claiming that Sudan has never filed one. We are saying that Sudan is not among the active requests and has no listed liaison.

Second, the requests closest to Sudan's needs are already being served. Yemen asked for help with "loss and damage tracking and capacity building", meaning systems to collect, document and analyse climate-related losses so that national and local institutions can plan and respond on evidence. Its call for proposals was published on 10 November 2025 (UNOPS/UN Global Marketplace, CFP/SN/24039/2025/YEM/003). Iraq asked for a "loss and damage baseline assessment and methodology guidebook focusing on agriculture and water sectors" (Santiago Network, call for proposals announcement, December 2025). Sudan needs both. Drought this year covered more than half of the country (UN News, 12 October 2026), and July–September rainfall was the lowest nationally in more than three decades, according to US Geological Survey data reported by Reuters (Reuters, 23 October 2026). We found no public estimate of what those seasons cost Sudan's farmers and herders. Without one, it is hard to make a credible case to any

fund. 3Bi is not putting a figure on Sudan's losses here. Producing that figure is exactly what such a request would be for.

Third, technical help is the bridge to money and to reporting Sudan already owes. The Network says it is strengthening its "access-to-finance function by supporting countries in developing financing frameworks and fundable proposals" (Santiago Network, 6 November 2026). The draft decision asks the Network and the FRLD Board to develop "operational modalities" for a coordinated approach at country level. As 3Bi noted on 23 October, Sudan already has three requests worth US$48.5 million in the FRLD's pipeline. The draft also welcomes the WIM Executive Committee's voluntary guidelines on collecting loss and damage data for biennial transparency reports. It stresses that they are non-prescriptive, and that a country's access to help and finance "is not contingent" on using them. Sudan told COP31's leaders that its first biennial transparency report is in preparation (SUNA, 11 November 2026). A liaison and a data-focused request could feed that report and strengthen the FRLD requests at the same time.

Addressing the Counter-Case

The strongest objection is that the Network is slow and small, and that joining one more queue will not change much. That is a fair concern. The draft decision itself notes that only four requests were under implementation and one completed. By 1 October, total contributions had reached about US$47.9 million from nine donors, of which US$36.8 million had arrived in cash, and a pledge from the United Kingdom was withdrawn during the year (FCCC/SB/2026/3/Add.2). But the timelines now on the table are meant to fix that slowness, and they will apply to requests already in the pipeline. The queue is also moving. Yemen's call for proposals went out in November 2025, and by October 2026 its assistance was moving into implementation. Joining costs little. If Sudan waits, the rules and the money will be shaped around the countries already in line.

A second objection is that Sudan's officials are stretched, in Antalya and at home, and that another focal point is a burden. 3Bi is not recommending that Sudan pull negotiators away from adaptation finance, where we argued yesterday that Sudan should put a number and a date behind its words. A National Liaison can be an existing environment or disaster-management official, as it is in many listed countries. The Network has a Desk Officer for LDCs in Dakar and a Regional Coordinator for Africa in Dar es Salaam, and it has released a simplified template that lets vulnerable communities ask for help directly. About 24 per cent of requests now come from civil society organisations, academia and local governments rather than national ministries (FCCC/SB/2026/3/Add.2). Sudan has research institutions that could help prepare a request once the government has opened the door.

What 3Bi Recommends, Specifically

First, by 17 November, when the Santiago Network holds its COP31 side event (Room SPE 6, Blue Zone, 13:00–14:30 Türkiye time), HCENR should send the Network's Secretariat the name of a National Liaison and an alternate. Sudan's delegation should also meet the Network's team at its Blue Zone office to confirm that a request is coming.

Second, by 31 January 2027, HCENR should submit a formal request, working with the agriculture and irrigation ministries and the Sudan Meteorological Authority and building on the draft started at the July 2025 workshop in Saly, Senegal. It should ask for a drought loss and damage baseline for rain-fed farming and pastoral livelihoods, together with a simple national system to record losses each season, modelled on the Iraq and Yemen requests.

Third, in COP31's closing days, Sudan's negotiators should work through the Group of 77 and China, the African Group and the LDC Group to keep four lines in the decision: indicative timelines for each stage of a request, the minimum share for vulnerable communities, coordination between the Network and the FRLD, and predictable multi-year funding.

Fourth, as it drafts Sudan's first biennial transparency report, HCENR should use the WIM Executive Committee's voluntary guidelines to include a short loss and damage section, and should state in the Santiago Network request that this is one intended use of the assistance.

Fifth, 3Bi will check the Network's public liaison list and active pipeline after COP31 and report what the adopted decision kept from the draft.

Sourcing & Contact

Primary sources: Earth Negotiations Bulletin (IISD), Vol. 12 No. 905, "Antalya Climate Change Conference: Thursday, 12 November 2026" (13 November 2026); UNFCCC, draft text on SBSTA 65 agenda item 5 / SBI 65 agenda item 12, joint annual report of the WIM Executive Committee and the Santiago Network (version of 11 November 2026, 10:00); UNFCCC, FCCC/SB/2026/3/Add.2, Annual report of the Santiago network 2026 (submitted 16 October 2026; distributed 29 October 2026); Santiago Network, "COP31: Santiago Network scales urgent technical assistance on climate-induced loss and damage" (press release, 6 November 2026); Santiago Network, National Liaisons page (accessed 13 November 2026); Santiago Network, Workshop for LDCs and SIDS – Africa, workshop report (Saly, Senegal, 22–24 July 2025); UNOPS / UN Global Marketplace, call for proposals CFP/SN/24039/2025/YEM/003, "Loss and damage tracking and capacity building in the Republic of Yemen" (published 10 November 2025); Santiago Network, announcement of calls for proposals for the Cook Islands, Iraq and Yemen (December 2025); UN News, report on drought across Sudan (12 October 2026; drought facts only); Reuters, report on El Niño-driven drought in Sudan citing USGS rainfall data (23 October 2026; rainfall data only); SUNA, report of Sudan's national statement to the COP31 Leaders' Summit (11 November 2026);

3Bi, “The Loss and Damage Fund Has Set Aside Its First US$20 Million. Sudan Has Three Requests in Line. Get One Ready for December.” (23 October 2026). The draft decision text may change before adoption. The National Liaisons page may not reflect the latest nominations. The full list of submitted requests is not public, so 3Bi does not claim that Sudan has never filed one. The Saly workshop report lists Sudan among 34 participating countries, each of which worked on a draft request; we have not seen Sudan’s draft. 3Bi is not claiming that Sudan has taken a position on the WIM or Santiago Network decision. For methodology questions or to propose a correction, contact 3Bi’s Research Team via 3bisudan.org.

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